

and that culminated in Hitler's "prophecy" speech to the Reichstag of January 30, 1939. While the Ribbentrop-Molotov nonaggression pact of August 1939 refuted the notion of either an international Jewish conspiracy or Jewish domination of the Soviet Union and briefly exposed the depths of Hitler's cynicism and disdain for ideological principle, the collapse of collective security enabled Hitler to launch and quickly win victories against Poland, the Low Countries, and France in 1939 and 1940, while the Soviet Union looked on without intervening. Moreover the Nazi antisemitic campaign against England ("the Jews among the Aryans") constituted an important chapter in its wartime propaganda offensive.

In the weeks leading up to the invasion of the Soviet Union, Goebbels began to orchestrate a vast propaganda offensive that focused once again on a major plank of Nazi prewar propaganda: namely the "Jewish-Bolshevik" conspiracy. In his "Proclamation to the German People" announcing the German invasion of the Soviet Union on June 22, 1941, Hitler squarely placed the blame for his decision on the "Jewish Bolsheviks" who held power in Moscow and who had been involved in an "encirclement policy with England" (echoes of the origins of World War I). Herf reveals how, as the fortunes of war began to turn inexorably against Germany, Nazi propaganda lost all touch with reality and retreated into a world of mythology in which "the Jews Are Guilty of Everything."

The strength of this book lies in the cogent manner in which the author establishes that a major shift occurred in Nazi propaganda during the war. But what, for example, were the nuanced responses of different sections of the community to the cumulative radicalization of antisemitic propaganda? Did such propaganda, for example, specifically target certain groups, and if so, how did they respond? Herf largely focuses on the role of the press and radio broadcasts. He also provides a very useful appendix that charts the antisemitic campaigns waged between 1939 and 1945 in the front-page stories of the *Völkischer Beobachter*. However, the cinema was arguably the mass medium of the first half of the twentieth century and yet it is a medium largely ignored by the author. It is a pity, moreover, that a book devoted to antisemitic propaganda should contain so little visual material.

The radical antisemitism of Nazi Germany's wartime propaganda constituted an interpretive prism through which Nazi leaders viewed and misconstrued events as they unfolded. Herf has written a thoughtful and provocative account of aspects of the propaganda that constructed a mythical Jewish enemy that threatened Germans in their homeland and legitimized war and ultimately genocide. As such it offers a timely reminder of the unfettered paranoid ideology that underpinned the Third Reich.

DAVID WELCH
University of Kent at Canterbury

WOLF GRUNER. *Widerstand in der Rosenstraße: Die Fabrik-Aktion und die Verfolgung der "Mischehen" 1943.* (Die Zeit des Nationalsozialismus.) Frankfurt a.M.: Fischer. 2005. Pp. 224. €12.95.

In Berlin, the Gestapo arrested and deported thousands of Jews during the "De-Judaization of the Reich" arrests, launched February 27, 1943, across Germany (*Fabrikaktion*). Also arrested and held separately at Rosenstrasse 2-4 in central Berlin were 2,000 intermarried Jews. Meeting outside, non-Jewish relatives began a protest that continued until March 6, when most intermarried Jews were released. Until recently, the widely accepted claims that protest by ordinary Germans rescued thousands of Jews co-existed silently with multitudinous commemorations of the July 20 conspiracy's lofty failure and common wisdom that Nazism crushed every public effort to protect Jews.

Wolf Gruner's account of the Rosenstrasse events and their postwar reception reverse previous conclusions. His promise to record history as it actually happened, on the basis of "newly available" documents (p. 10), illustrates characteristics of neo-Rankean history. He argues primarily from Gestapo directives at Reich and three subordinate levels outside of Berlin that authorities never intended to deport intermarried Jews incarcerated in Berlin. Rather, "very explicitly," the intention behind their arrest was removal from their jobs (p. 55). For two reasons the Gestapo held intermarried Jews at Rosenstrasse 2-4, "many" for more than nine days (p. 128): to verify their "racial status" (p. 110) and to select 225 replacements for newly deported "full Jews" working in Jewish institutions (pp. 128, 119). Notions that protests rescued intermarried Jews are postwar inventions, "legends based on reports from survivors and subjective impressions" (p. 202).

Gruner states that "certainly" public commemorations of the protest multiplied after unification because Germany needed to represent itself as a "new and better country" (p. 14). Gruner's dissertation adviser Wolfgang Benz did write during the year of unification that the protest was "a success in resistance (*Widerstand*) accomplished by a minority which in the society of the Nazi state existed on the boundary of those without rights!" This clashed, however, with less spectacular appraisals placing the protest in context of the regime's peculiar anxiety about social unrest, its efforts to conduct genocide secretly, its long struggle to quietly dissolve intermarried couples, and a related series of decisions to "temporarily" exempt them from deportations. In 1995 Gruner countered that "obviously" all interpretations that the protest deterred Gestapo plans "certainly do not hold up within the historical context." His incisive dissertation-based book of 1997 reiterates this and his reasoning and conclusions have changed little since.

Gruner draws important documents into this debate. Yet his interpretations rely on conjectures. Thus a considerable number of young children were "obviously" included among those incarcerated for the job selection

at Rosenstrasse 2–4 “so they would not be left alone at home when their parents were arrested” (p. 109). To the image of a Gestapo carefully arresting children is joined the claim that no harm was intended to intermarried Jews at a time officials struggled to complete “racial” purification. Gruner supposes that orders were carried out as written (p. 194) and reflected honest intentions of a regime well known for trickery, especially in genocide.

Good history not only has footnotes but makes sense. Rounding up 2,000 (from work, home, and streets) and interning them for up to twelve days was hardly “the easiest” way for the Gestapo to verify status and select eleven percent for promotion (p. 121). Why not do this in the four main collection centers other than Rosenstrasse 2–4, rather than facilitating collective protest by sorting out and interning intermarried Jews separately? The Gestapo continuously surveyed German Jews, so why was “racial status” verification (pp. 110, 118) necessary? Why check only 2,000 of Berlin’s 8,800 intermarried Jews (p. 195)?

Gruner’s thesis depends on dismissing, overlooking, or misconstruing sources. When he says the Gestapo checked “racial status” he presumably means marital status, since intermarried Jews were “full” Jews. Ignoring the distinction between “racial” and marital status leads to errors in understanding the persecution of intermarried Jews, notable here in Gruner’s treatment of men sent from Rosenstrasse to Auschwitz as cases of “protective custody,” not intermarriage (pp. 166–172). Gruner dismisses evidence in Hans Adler’s classic work as “very vague” (p. 25). Antonia Leugers’s vital refutation of the argued role of the churches falls on deaf ears, as does Joachim Neander’s thesis that Auschwitz commandants were pulling for more laborers. (Considering the critical importance Gruner attributes to the Jewish community’s documents on the selection from Rosenstrasse of replacement workers, it is peculiar that Berlin’s Centrum Judaica has denied Neander’s repeated requests to read them, despite an appeal from the German Studies Association on Neander’s behalf.) As evidence that the reviewer “advocates” a thesis that further protests would have “impeded” the Holocaust, Gruner cites a provocative question asking whether further similar protests might have “slowed or impeded” the annihilation (p. 28). Although this reviewer has always argued that the regime avoided using force for tactical reasons, Gruner says that he claims the regime could not have quelled the protest with force (p. 157). Gruner alternately cites or dismisses Joseph Goebbels’s diaries, suggesting perhaps that a real document bears Nazi insignia. His claim that interpreting the protest as influential was a postwar invention depends on dismissing an American intelligence report of April 1, 1943, based on a “trustworthy” source, that a Gestapo “action against Jewish wives and husbands . . . had to be discontinued some time ago because of the protest which such action aroused.” As for unification reviving interest in Rosenstrasse events, work that “decisively” in-

fluenced the “reception history” began in 1985 and resulted in “the first presentation of research results” by mid-1989. The first published debate on the Rosenstrasse protest occurred in 1995–1996, independently of any unification influence.

Given his work, Gruner concludes, any interpretations that protests interrupted a plan for deporting intermarried Jews are “hardly convincing” (p. 165). This may well be due in part to his lack of analysis, and indeed the dearth of study generally on collective protest as a form of opposition in Nazi Germany. Research on the Rosenstrasse events is just beginning, not ending.

NATHAN STOLTZFUS
Florida State University

DAGMAR BARNOUW. *The War in the Empty Air: Victims, Perpetrators, and Postwar Germans*. Bloomington: Indiana University Press. 2005. Pp. xiv, 303. \$29.95.

In this intriguing but deeply flawed book, Dagmar Barnouw makes a passionate plea for normalizing the public memory of German suffering in World War II. According to Barnouw, “the nearly total exclusion from historical memory of German wartime experiences, among them large-scale air raids, mass deportations, and warfare involving millions of conscripts, has over the decades created a serious loss of historical reality” (p. xii). She adds that she is not interested in German suffering for its own sake, since “all populations caught in this particularly terrible war suffered,” but for the profoundly negative effects “an enduring hierarchy of suffering” has in the present. According to Barnouw, “The single most exploitable political commodity in the postwar era has been Nazi Evil” (p. 1). Memory, according to Barnouw, is power, and one who controls memory has the capacity to manipulate politics.

This has played out somewhat differently in the United States and Germany but, on Barnouw’s reading, politics in both countries are shaped by a heavily censored, hierarchical memory of World War II. In the United States, the tendency is to want to recollect only America’s “good war” (p. 102). Indeed, frequently citing President George W. Bush’s rhetoric (pp. 3–5, 9–10, 171–172), she blames the contemporary chaos in the Middle East and America’s strong support for Israel on the distorted memory of World War II (pp. 18, 99). If such memory of the war has been used to inflate and legitimate American power, in Germany it has been used to create a censorial climate, full of taboos, which has been “problematic for ordinary Germans’ perceptions of the domestic and foreign politics of their country” (p. 99). Indeed, if memory is for Barnouw a question of power, its corollary is forgetting and “impotence” (pp. xiv, 12–21) and for her, it is clear that it is the Germans who have become impotent in the face of the “still accumulating power of Jewish memory discourses” (p. 64).

There are at least three fundamental problems with this argument, aside from the often tendentious and polemical tone in which Barnouw makes it. First, her con-